Changes in Byzantine tactics between the sixth and tenth centuries

Beginning in the year 330, the Byzantine Empire used its well-trained and flexible military to outlast its Western Roman counterpart by a millennium.  The Byzantines celebrated their highest degree of success between the sixth and tenth centuries. Their borders reached their peak under the emperor Justinian I. Justinian began one of the greatest building programs of the Middle Ages, spreading Byzantine artistic and architectural influences throughout Europe. The emperor Heraclius defeated the longtime rival of the Byzantines: Sassanian Persia. But it was the Byzantine army that made all of this possible.  The Byzantines left many military manuals for posterity, which allow us a greater understanding of Byzantine military theory than nearly any other medieval style of warfare. By using these manuals, as well as other historical sources which corroborate their use, we can see not only the changing tactics of the Byzantine army, but also the influences that shape the Byzantine army.

In the fifth century, the Byzantine army began to solidify in its general structure, which would last through at least the eleventh century. Through encounters with the Huns and other nomadic steppe-cavalrymen, the Byzantines established an army in which the mounted-archer was the dominant force.[1] By the sixth century, the mounted archer became the primary arm of the Byzantine military. Sixth century military manuals such as the Strategikon and the Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy (henceforth Strategy) describe the Byzantine cavalryman in depth. The Strategikon, attributed to the emperor Maurice at the end of the sixth century, describes the equipment expected to be carried by a Byzantine cavalryman:

They should have hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles, […] carrying cases; helmets with small plumes on top; bows suited to the strength of each man […] cases broad enough that when necessary they can fit the strung bows in them, with spare bow strings in their saddle bags; quivers with covers holding about thirty or forty arrows […] cavalry lances of the Avar type, […] swords[2]

 describes the Byzantine cavalryman as both a mobile archer and as a shock-charge soldier: “On horseback at a run he should fire one or two arrows rapidly and put the strung bow in its case… and then he should grab the spear which he has been carrying on his back.”[3] Strategy also treats the ideas behind the cavalry formation: “it too possesses its own kind of forcefulness in attacking, since it does not fall upon the enemy in a slow or measured way but charges at full speed. This charge is really terrifying to men who have not had years of combat experience.”[4] What emerges is a picture of a body of cavalry which would approach their enemy, loose several volleys of arrows against their opponents, and then charge in on the enemy while they’re still recovering from the arrow storm. While knights in Western Europe required support from peasant archers and infantry, the Byzantines developed a system in which their cavalry could be self-sufficient. However, the Byzantines did not force their cavalry to do it all.

The Byzantines did train infantry for battle as well as for garrisoning cities and forts. The basic formation for Byzantine infantry was the phalanx. This infantry formation was meant to complement the use of cavalry on the battlefield. While the cavalry became the primary arm of action for the Byzantines by using their high mobility to strategically maneuver against the enemy, the infantry became the solid block of the army which was used to hold ground. Strategy describes the formation of the phalanx: “A phalanx is a formation of armed men designed to hold off the enemy. It may assume a variety of shapes: the circle, the lozenge, the rhomboid, the wedge, the hollow wedge, and many others.”[5] The strength of the phalanx formation is evident in the Strategikon, where Maurice describes that the infantry phalanx should be used to protect the more valuable cavalry formations: “If the army wants to draw up for battle, but not actually engage in fighting that day, and the enemy charges against our cavalry… they should not await the charge in their position… but should move in behind the infantry.”[6] The phalanx formation often forms the center of the battle-line, and therefore would be expected not to break. This strength was meant to work in close accordance with the maneuverability of the Byzantine cavalry. While the infantry could never hope to be as mobile as the cavalry, there were instructions for different maneuvers for both branches.

In the sixth century, maneuver had become the hallmark of the Byzantine military. Strategy makes the argument that “very few people nowadays have any practical knowledge of tactics,” and sets out to educate its readers in the fine arts of maneuver.[7] It describes the types of movement that the phalanx can move: “the regular march, the change of front, the changing of its own formation, uniting a phalanx which has been split up, dividing a unified phalanx.”[8] The Strategikon provides the types of maneuvers which would be given for maneuver on the battlefield. These orders include phrases such as: “give way”; “turn, threaten”; “to the left/right, change front”; “about face”; and “change place.” The orders to “give way” and to “turn, threaten” describe orders to present a false retreat before wheeling about upon your enemies.[9] Changing front to the left or right is done in response to a threat from that direction, or to swiftly maneuver to one side or another. It is a maneuver which forces each man in the formation to turn individually, which means that the formation does not move, but the front of the formation changes its formation.[10] The orders to “about face” and “change place” both move the formation around 180 degrees. When the commander gives the order to “about face,” each man pivots in place, while the order to “change place” causes the whole formation to turn by marching out.[11] Maurice also describes to us the need to use surprise attacks and maneuvers, especially when the Byzantines were outnumbered: “it is better… to try to employ different surprises and tricks as much as possible rather than engage in a pitched battle which involves dangers which could prove fatal.”[12] This becomes a common sentiment in the Strategikon and Maurice continually stresses the importance of maneuver and flexible formations.

Maurice writes in Greek, the common language of the Byzantine Empire, but most of the orders listed in the Strategikon are listed in Latin. This is evidence that despite the major shift away from the Roman style of fighting (legionary infantry acting as the primary military arm), the Byzantines cling to their Roman military heritage by preserving  their military language. The order to “Give way. Turn. Threaten” translates from the Latin “Cede. Torna mina.”[13] The order to march in line comes from the Latin “Equaliter ambula.”[14] The Byzantines also mimic their Roman ancestors by making use of a large officer corps. Besides the general and his personal staff, there are merarchs (also called stratelates and includes the lieutenant general) who command the largest formations, the meros. Beneath the merarchs are the moirarchs (also called dukes or chiliarchs) who command detachments of two-to-three thousand men. Below the moirarchs are the counts (also called tribunes) which oversee the individual formations which are called tagmas or bandons and which consist of three-to-four hundred men. Within each tagma are the hekatontarchs, ilarchs, dekarchs, pentarchs, tetrarchs, file guards, heralds, and standard bearers.[15] This extended officer corps is a strict meritocracy and is very reminiscent of the Roman obsession with organization. We have seen the influence of Roman military heritage on the military manuals of the sixth century.

These manuals were not simply written as practices in military theory. They were put to use on the battlefields and off, and the evidence is quite clear. The general Belisarius, after his victories against the Vandals, returned to Constantinople and was celebrated in a traditional triumph. This traditional celebration, according to Procopius, had not been celebrated since the emperors Titus and Trajan.[16] Belisarius, during his defense of Rome against the Ostrogoths, utilized his cavalry in an unusual way. He sent two hundred soldiers under a commander named Trajan to attack an Ostrogothic camp. The cavalry detachment moved to a hilltop and enticed the Goths to leave their camp. The Goths moved out against this small force and the Byzantines began successfully showering arrows upon their enemies: “And since their shafts fell among a dense throng, they were for the most part successful in hitting a man or a horse. But when all their missiles had at last failed them, they rode off to the rear with all speed.”[17] The Goths chased the Byzantine cavalry back to the walls of Rome, where the defenders upon the walls began firing upon them with bows and siege engines.  The Goths suffered nearly one thousand casualties because they couldn’t match the mobility and versatility of the Byzantine cavalry.[18] Another example of using the Byzantine maneuverability to surprise and defeat an opponent came under the leadership of the emperor Heraclius. When the Persians failed to surprise Heraclius with an attack at dawn, Heraclius ordered his men to execute a false retreat. The Persians pursued and broke ranks. Then, the Byzantines wheeled about and decimated their Persian enemies.[19] This is not just an example of Maurice’s maxim of using surprises and tricks, but also an example of the orders to “Give way” and then “Turn, threaten.”

By the ninth and tenth centuries, the Byzantines had seen an explosion in the writing of military manuals. Sources such as the Anonymous Book on Tactics, the Taktika by the general Nicephorus Ouranos, and the Praeceptra militaria and Skirmishing, both possibly by the emperor Nicephorus II Phocas, all combine to show the depth and breadth of Byzantine military theory. The Praecepta militaria lists several distinctions of cavalry. In addition to basic mounted archers, the Praecepta lists light cavalry (called prokoursatores) and heavy cavalry (kataphraktoi). The prokoursatores would be used as scouts before battle, and during battle would be used to “stir up” an enemy which is hesitant to engage.[20] The heavily-armed and armored kataphraktoi would be formed into a large wedge and used in a classic cavalry shock-charge:

 “The triangular formation of kataphraktoi must then carry on at its pace and its front line must strike against the commander of the enemy formation… the enemy will be put to flight… they will smash the heads and bodies of the enemy and their horses with their iron maces and sabers, they will break into and dismember their formations, and from there break through them and so completely destroy them.”[21]

 This is likely an influence from Byzantine interactions with Western Europeans, who stereotypically over-relied on the heavy-cavalry shock-charge. This shows the continued shaping of the Byzantine military by foreign sources. This shows a definite shift from the concept of a highly versatile cavalry corps to a more specialized variety of cavalry types. These new cavalry variations could not possibly match their sixth-century counterparts for their wide range of skills, but could likely be more effective in their individual uses. If the three types of tenth-century cavalry could coordinate their actions effectively, they could prove to be much more devastating. This type of coordination required even more precision and training than it did in the sixth century. This demonstrates a major change in the Byzantine military.

Through these examples we see not only the changing tactics of the Byzantine army, but also the influences that shape the Byzantine army. The sixth century manuals clearly demonstrate the importance of a flexible, versatile core of cavalry which work in conjunction with infantry to out maneuver their enemies. The tenth century manuals stress the importance of a variety of highly specialized cavalry. And we have seen aspects of these manuals enacted in the historical record. The Byzantine military, through its flexibility and effectiveness, helped the Byzantine Empire last one thousand years.


~Written by Shelby Harris

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[1] Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, 56.

[2] Maurice, Strategikon, trans. George T. Dennis in Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 12.

[3] Maurice, 11.

[4] Anonymous, “The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy,” in Three Byzantine Military Treatises, Translated and edited by George T. Dennis, 9-136, (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1985), 59.

[5] Strategy, 47.

[6] Maurice, 144.

[7] Strategy, 47.

[8] Strategy, 59.

[9] Maurice, 39.

[10] Maurice, 39.

[11] Maurice, 39.

[12] Maurice, 93.

[13] Maurice, 39.

[14] Maurice, 38.

[15] Maurice, 16-17.

[16] Procopius, History of the Wars, Books I and II: The Persian Wars, translated by H.B. Dewing, LaVergne, TN: Dodo Press, 2010, 106.

[17] Procopius, History of the Wars, Books V and VI: The Gothic War, translated by H.B. Dewing, LaVergne, TN: Dodo Press, 2010, 97.

[18] Procopius, The Gothic War, 97.

[19] Theophanes, “Chronographia,” trans. Harry Turtledove in The Chronicle of Theophanes, Anni mundi 6095-6305 (A.D. 602-813), (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), 15.

[20] Nicephorus II Phocas, Praecepta militaria, in Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century, trans. and edited by Eric McGeer, 12-60, (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995) 27.

[21] Nicephorus Ouranos, Taktika, in Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century, trans. and edited by Eric McGeer, 88-164, (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995) 129.